With judgment no. 35 of 20 March 2026, the Constitutional Court has closed a matter that had ignited debate among criminal law practitioners and legal professionals: the penalties provided for those who have unlawfully obtained citizenship income through false declarations or omissions are constitutionally legitimate. A decision that deserves careful analysis, both for its practical implications and for the legal principles underpinning it.
The Case: What the Florence Tribunal Had Raised
The matter originates from an order issued by the Florence Tribunal, which had questioned the constitutional legitimacy of Article 7, paragraph 1, of Decree-Law no. 4 of 2019 — subsequently converted into Law no. 26 of 2019 — insofar as it punishes with imprisonment from two to six years anyone who, with the aim of unlawfully receiving citizenship income, submits false declarations or documents, makes use of untruthful attestations, or omits relevant information.
The referring judge maintained that such a statutory sentencing range was excessively severe, proposing in the alternative a penalty of between six months and three years, or, in the further alternative, between six months and six years. In support of the question, two specific constitutional parameters were invoked: Article 3 (principle of equality and reasonableness) and Article 27, third paragraph (rehabilitative purpose of punishment).
The Two Grounds of Challenge Examined by the Court
The Court addressed the two profiles of alleged unconstitutionality separately:
- Intrinsic disproportionality of the penalty: the Florence Tribunal considered that the statutory minimum of two years' imprisonment was in itself unreasonably high relative to the typical gravity of the criminalised conduct. The Constitutional Court rejected this argument, emphasising that the offence is circumscribed and specific, and that a severe sanction — severe as it may be — does not reach the threshold of manifest unreasonableness required to justify an ablative intervention by the Court.
- Unreasonableness by comparison with other offences: the referring judge had drawn a comparison between the challenged provision and the penalties prescribed for aggravated fraud (Art. 640, second paragraph, no. 1, and Art. 640-bis of the Italian Criminal Code) and for the unlawful receipt of public disbursements (Art. 316-ter of the Italian Criminal Code), identifying a disparity in treatment that was difficult to justify.
The Grounds of Non-Merits: The Court's Reasoning
On the comparison with fraud offences, the Court adopted a clear position: the offences under Articles 640 and 640-bis of the Italian Criminal Code do not constitute a valid point of reference. The differing structure of the conduct and the distinct nature of the constituent elements preclude a homogeneous comparison capable of revealing a violation of the principle of equality.
More elaborate is the reasoning
